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Abstract
Although a growing body of evidence suggests that genuine and deceptive facial
expressions differ, previous work is mixed as to whether observers can discern between
them. One explanation is that cues to deception on the face are subtle and not readily
perceived by observers. I argue that the way people process faces may obscure these
cues, making them ‘unseen’ by observers. In the current work, I pit two hypotheses
against each other to test whether interrupting holistic processing improves or impairs the
ability to identify deceptive emotional expressions. Since people process faces
holistically, one region of the face may interfere with or bias observers’ perception of
other regions. Importantly, however, interrupting holistic processing by misaligning faces
allows people to more accurately detect emotion expressed in one region with less
interference from other regions of the face. Since deceptive expressions involve partial
expressions wherein felt emotion ‘leaks out’ in the upper or lower face only, I suggest
that interrupting holistic processing will increase observers’ ability to identify the
incongruence among the face halves. Alternatively, it is possible that the subjective
disfluency experienced when viewing incongruent expressions could be used as a cue to
deception, suggesting that holistic processing would facilitate the detection of
incongruence. Three studies test these competing hypotheses by asking observers to rate
the genuineness of facial expressions that were artificially produced (Pilot Study, Study
1) or real and posed (Study 2). Holistic processing was interrupted by horizontally
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misaligning faces. Across all studies, the subjective disfluency hypothesis was not
supported. Instead, observers rated incongruent (Pilot Study, Study 1) and posed (Study
2) expressions as less genuine when holistic processing was interrupted with
misalignment (vs. aligned faces). This interpretation, however, is complicated by the
findings for congruent (Study 1) and genuine (Study 2) expressions, wherein misaligned
faces were rated as less genuine than aligned faces. Future research should continue to
consider how people visually process faces and its impact on veracity judgments. By
borrowing insights from vision science, we may better understand factors affecting
observers’ ability to detect genuine (vs. deceptive) facial expressions.
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Chapter One
People often lie—on average, in one of every four social interactions per day
(DePaulo et al., 1996). While many of these lies are harmless and socially appropriate,
‘big’ lies can have dramatic consequences if undetected (Ekman, 2009; Vrij, 2008). For
example, lies told by perpetrators or witnesses of crimes are of grave concern to law
enforcement, as identifying (or misidentifying) lies in this context can have serious
consequences for the pursuit of justice and public safety (Kassin et al., 2010). Depending
on the context, these lies may be aided by acts of emotional deception wherein genuine
emotional expressions are suppressed, false emotional expressions are simulated, or both
(e.g., ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). However, behavioral cues to deception in general, and
cues to deceptive emotional expressions specifically, are subtle (e.g., DePaulo et al.,
2003; Ekman et al., 1981; Hurley & Frank, 2011; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008), and people
perform poorly at discriminating liars from truth-tellers (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006;
Evanoff et al., 2016; Stel & van Dijk, 2018; Zloteanu et al., 2019). Accordingly, some
scholars have suggested that accuracy could be improved if behavioral cues to deception
were actively exacerbated, making them easier to perceive and incorporate into decisions
about veracity (Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij & Mann, 2004).
I build upon this explanation to suggest that visual perception plays an important
role in deception detection and that greater consideration of the visual processing of faces
may help to explain why subtle cues are not used by observers to make more accurate
1

truth–lie judgments. Specifically, I borrow insights from the vision science literature on
how we process faces to suggest that interrupting holistic processing of faces may
increase sensitivity to deception cues of emotional facial expressions.
Emotional Facial Expressions
Darwin (1872) proposed that universal facial expressions of emotion have
evolved in a process where specific facial movements served a biologically adaptive
function for the sender and the observer and, over a long period of time, become innately
associated with signaling emotion. He described these expressions as ‘serviceable habits’
where particular movements of the face prepared the sender for perception and action,
and for observers, these movements came to communicate emotional states. Although
there is considerable debate about the universality of human emotional facial expressions,
Ekman and colleagues purported to have identified basic emotional expressions of
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust (Ekman, 1971; Ekman & Friesen,
1971; Matsumoto, 1992; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995). In this view, emotions are reliably
expressed in the form of specific morphological changes in facial musculature, and
observers can accurately decode these movements to infer expressers’ emotional states
(Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Levenson, 2011). Evidence for the universality
of these expressions comes from research that supports the consistent production and
recognition of these basic emotions cross-culturally, including among indigenous groups
who had no or limited contact with Western influences (Cowen & Keltner, 2020; Ekman
et al., 1969, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994; Matsumoto et al., 2008).
Other researchers, however, have disagreed with the notion of basic universal
emotions, suggesting that some semantic categories are not pancultural, that emotions
2

cannot always be inferred from facial expressions, and that there is significant
heterogeneity in the way each of the basic emotions is conveyed (e.g., Barrett et al., 2019;
Russell, 1995). Despite the continuing controversy surrounding the production of
emotional facial expressions and their relation to felt emotions, when presented with
prototypical expressions of so-called basic emotions, observers reliably recognize them
as communicating distinct emotional categories at levels above chance ( for a review, see
Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2016; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Thus, regardless of the
reliability with which they reflect one’s inner emotional experience, emotional facial
expressions serve a social and communicative function (Fridlund, 2014; Keltner et al.,
2006; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Lee & Anderson, 2017; Matsumoto et al., 2008;
Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Van Kleef, 2009).
According to the social functional account, emotional facial expressions activate
predictable emotional and behavioral responses from observers (e.g., Keltner & Kring,
1998; Van Kleef, 2010). For example, the prototypical expression of sadness, with its
furrowed brow and downturned lips, generally elicits sympathy and help from observers
(Marsh et al., 2007; Small & Verrochi, 2009). Alternatively, a friendly display, such as a
smile, signals affiliation and safety, whereas a display of fear should alert an observer to
external threats (Adams & Kleck, 2003; Marsh et al., 2005; Rychlowska et al., 2017).
Thus, the ability to accurately perceive and extract meaning from expressions of emotion
is an important social skill that aids in social coordination (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).
Deceptive Emotional Facial Expressions
Deception can be defined as a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt to
create in another a belief that the communicator considers to be untrue (Vrij, 2008).
3

While there is evidence that people can accurately discriminate between expressions of
distinct emotions (e.g., happiness and sadness), the ability to discriminate between
genuine expressions from those deliberately expressed for the purposes of manipulation
(i.e., deceptive expressions) appears much poorer (e.g., Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; Stel &
van Dijk, 2018). For decades, researchers have aimed to discover and quantify reliable
cues to deception in the verbal and nonverbal behavior of liars compared to truth-tellers
and to determine whether people can accurately distinguish those who have lied and
those who have told the truth (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003). Although much of this research
on deception has focused on false intentions, statements, or opinions, some research has
specifically focused on deceptive emotional facial expressions (Ekman et al., 1988;
Hurley & Frank, 2011; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; ten Brinke et al., 2012; ten Brinke &
Porter, 2012a). Deceptive emotional expressions can be simulations that occur when an
expression is adopted but is not actually accompanied by a genuine, felt emotion (e.g., a
person smiles despite not feeling any happiness) or masks that conceal a felt emotion with
a different, unfelt emotional expression (e.g., a person experiencing sadness attempts to
hide their emotion). An underlying emotion may also be neutralized when it is
intentionally inhibited to express no emotion on the face. Each of these acts is considered
deceptive to the extent that they are used intentionally for the purpose of misleading an
observer about one’s true emotional state (Vrij, 2008).
Deceptive facial expressions appear to differ in subtle ways relative to genuine
facial expressions borne of real, felt emotion. According to the inhibition hypothesis
(Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 2003), deceptive facial expressions may be revealed by at least
two possible outcomes. First, deceivers attempting to simulate an unfelt emotion might
4

not be able to pose the expression adequately, resulting in missing facial actions relative
to a genuine expression (Ekman, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; ten Brinke et al., 2012).
Secondly, deceivers attempting to mask a genuinely felt emotion might fail in doing so,
resulting in leakage of facial actions that reveal the underlying felt emotion (Ekman et
al., 1988; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Relatedly, deceptive compared to genuine facial
expressions may involve greater left–right morphological asymmetry (Dopson et al.,
1984; Ekman et al., 1981; Hill & Craig, 2002) or differ dynamically, such as having a
more abrupt onset, longer apex, or an offset that is abrupt or irregular (Ekman & Friesen,
1982; Hess & Kleck, 1990; see also Horic-Asselin et al., 2020).
The first to draw attention to the idea that genuine and deceptive displays of
emotion may differ visibly was a French physiologist named Guillaume Duchenne
(Duchenne & Cuthbertson, 1862/2006). He proposed that a key difference of a genuine
compared to a false smile was the activation of the orbicularis oculi—a muscle around
the eyes which pulls the cheeks up while lowering the brow, creating ‘crow’s feet’ in the
outer eye corners (Ekman, 1992). Although recent work by Gunnery, Hall, & Ruben
(2013) suggests that this muscle can be deliberately activated by a substantial proportion
of people (71%), the absence of its activation may still serve as a subtle cue to deception
in some contexts. For example, Ekman, Friesen, and O’Sullivan (1988) recorded nursing
students while watching two films: a pleasant and emotionally neutral (nature) film and
then an unpleasant and emotionally evocative (amputations and burns) film. While they
watched each film, an interviewer blind to the film they were watching asked them a
series of questions about how they were feeling. During the emotionally neutral film,
participants were asked to be honest about how they felt, whereas during the emotionally
5

evocative film, they were asked to be deceptive by concealing any fear, distress, or
disgust. The nursing students’ facial actions were coded with the Facial Action Coding
System (FACS), which taxonomizes facial movements by coding independent facial
actions (i.e., action units; Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Results revealed that during the
emotionally evocative film, deceptive (vs. honest) participants displayed more masking
(vs. genuine) smiles. Specifically, masking (vs. genuine) smiles did not include activation
of orbicularis oculi, pars orbitalis (AU6)—which pull the skin towards the eye, causing
crow’s feet wrinkles—and instead included only activation of the zygomaticus major
(AU 12), which pulls the lip corners obliquely. Deception was also associated with facial
action units associated with fear, disgust, contempt, sadness, and anger (see also Ekman
& Friesen, 1982). Thus, while the nursing students’ deceptive facial expressions engaged
intended facial actions in the lower face (i.e., smiling), leakage of unintended facial
actions occurred in the upper face.
More recently, Porter and ten Brinke (2008)completed a more comprehensive
investigation of genuine and falsified facial expressions, including happiness, sadness,
fear, and disgust. Using a similar paradigm to Ekman et al. (1988), participants were
asked to display a genuine, simulated, masked, or neutralized expression in response to
emotionally evocative images while their expressions were videotaped and subsequently
analyzed frame-by-frame with FACS. Results revealed that masked emotions, in
particular, resulted in more leakage of inconsistent facial actions and that negativelyvalenced emotions were more likely to involve leakage than happiness. Participants were
largely successful in deceptively neutralizing felt emotion, however, resulting in no
significant difference of leakage compared to genuine expressions. Importantly, findings
6

did not support the notion of micro-expressions—complete, full-face expressions of felt
emotion that flash across the face in 1/25th to 1/5th of a second (Ekman & Friesen,
1969)—as reliable cues to deception. First, instances of leakage that lasted this short
duration emerged as partial- (not full-) faced expressions: they occurred in either upper or
lower face only. Additionally, most instances of inconsistent emotional leakage occurred
for much longer durations than previously proposed—on the order of 0.4 to 2.15 seconds
(Matsumoto & Hwang, 2018; Porter et al., 2012; Yan et al., 2013).
Other experimental work using designs with greater mundane realism finds
similar results. For example, in a mock crime interrogation paradigm, Frank and Ekman
(1997) gave participants an opportunity to steal $50 from a briefcase and were told that if
they could convince an interrogator that they did not steal the money, they could keep it.
Importantly, they were also told that if they could not convince the interrogator of their
innocence, they would have to forfeit their participation fee of $10, the $50 they stole,
and would be punished by enduring one hour of randomly sequenced white noise blasts at
110 decibels. After coding participants’ videotaped interrogation interviews, results
revealed that the presence or absence of facial actions associated with prototypical
expressions of fear and disgust could differentiate 80% of liars and truth-tellers.
While laboratory-produced stakes and efforts to increase mundane realism
suggest that some subtle cues to deceptive emotional expressions exist (e.g., Frank &
Ekman, 1997), research involving real, high stakes lies and truths provides additional
evidence. Specifically, deceptive murderers, pleading for the safe return of a missing
relative that they were later convicted for killing, are less likely to engage facial actions
associated with prototypical displays of sadness (i.e., furrowed brow; AU 1+4), but more
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likely to engage facial actions associated with prototypical happiness ( i.e., AU 12; ten
Brinke et al., 2012, 2012).
One potential explanation of why leakage or failed simulations of prototypical
morphology may occur is due to the relative controllability of action units associated with
the basic expressions of emotion. For example, several studies have found that some
facial actions are more voluntarily controllable than others (e.g., Ekman et al., 1980;
Gosselin et al., 2010). Ekman (2003) proposed that action units (AUs) could be
categorized as those that are not readily subject to voluntary control (reliable action
units) and those that are (versatile action units). Indeed, Mehu, Mortillaro, Bänziger, &
Scherer (2012) found that reliable (vs. versatile) AUs proposed by Ekman (2003) were
more difficult for participants to control voluntarily. Moreover, when posing or feigning
emotions, voluntary control of specific AUs may also result in co-activation of
unintended AUs (Gosselin et al., 2010), resulting in inconsistent expressions, or
expressions that deviate from prototypical displays, such as those found in the nursing
students described above (Ekman et al., 1988). Further, reliable action units may better
reveal deception in increasingly emotional contexts. For example, additional work
investigated participants who were filmed displaying genuine and deceptive facial
expressions while viewing high- and low-intensity emotional images, revealing that high
(vs. low) intensity emotional images led to higher rates of emotional leakage in upper
(but not lower) face (Porter et al., 2012).
In the context of deception research, Hurley and Frank (2011) identified the
relative utility of reliable versus versatile action units using a mock crime paradigm.
Specifically, they randomly assigned participants to either steal or not steal a pair of
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movie tickets from an envelope and were subsequently interviewed about the theft of the
tickets. If they could convince the interviewer that they did not steal the tickets, truthtellers were given one ticket, whereas liars were given two tickets as a bonus. They were
also told that if they were unable to convince the interviewer of their innocence, they
would receive no reward and would endure a long and boring questionnaire as a
punishment. Importantly, participants were also randomly assigned to either suppress
smiles, suppress eyebrow movements, or were told about the importance of convincing
the interviewer of their honesty (control). FACS coding of interviews with participants
indicated that while participants who lied or told the truth were largely successful in
suppressing smiles when instructed to do so, liars (vs. truth-tellers) were not able to
suppress their brow movements—a reliable facial action—despite explicit instruction.
In sum, although differences can be subtle, evidence suggests that deceptive
displays of emotion differ from genuine expressions borne of felt emotion. Findings
across highly controlled experiments and ecologically valid studies with real, high stakes
provide a slowly growing body of evidence to support Darwin’s (1872) inhibition
hypothesis: the presence of inappropriate facial actions (i.e., leakage) or absence of
appropriate facial actions occur during deceptive emotional expressions since some facial
actions are harder to voluntarily suppress or simulate, respectively.
Detecting Deceptive Emotions
Despite evidence that subtle behavioral indicators of veracity exist in facial
expressions, people’s ability to detect deceptive emotional expressions is mixed. For
example, some studies have found that observers are not able to discriminate between
genuine and deceptive displays of sadness, fear, surprise, or disgust, above chance (Hess
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& Kleck, 1994; Porter et al., 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; Soppe, 1988; Stel & van
Dijk, 2018; Zloteanu et al., 2019). Other studies, in contrast, have found that observers
are able to discriminate between genuine and deceptive displays of happiness, sadness,
fear (McLellan et al., 2010), enjoyment compared to non-enjoyment smiles (Miles &
Johnston, 2007), traces of negative emotions in smiles (Perron et al., 2016), and
amusement, surprise, disgust, and sadness (Namba et al., 2018). As a potential
explanation for these mixed findings, a recent meta-analysis indicates that the variability
in observers’ accuracy in detecting deceptive emotions may be due to the strength and
perceivability of the cues displayed (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Building upon this
explanation, it is possible that the manner in which we visually process faces may play a
role in explaining accuracy in detecting deceptive emotional expressions. Here, I review
how people visually process faces, in general, and emotional expressions, in particular.
Visual Processing of Faces
Although most objects are visually processed based on their individual parts (e.g.,
Biederman, 1987), the face is different in that it is processed holistically: we identify and
recognize a face as a complete unit or gestalt, rather than a sum of its parts (e.g., a pair of
eyes, a nose, and a mouth; Farah et al., 1998; Peterson & Rhodes, 2006; Piepers &
Robbins, 2012). Related to holistic processing is configural processing, or processing the
interrelationships between different facial features, such as the shape and position of the
nose, mouth, and eyes (Carey & Diamond, 1977). Configural processing involves two
forms of information: first-order relational properties, which refer to the basic
configuration of features of a face (e.g., eyes above the nose), and second-order
relational properties, which refer to variations in the spacing between and positioning of
10

the features. While first-order relational properties are important for detecting a face (vs.
another object), second-order relational properties allow discrimination between different
faces(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). Configural processing is thus
best described as the integration of all or some of the second-order information within a
face and, importantly, suggests that the face is processed holistically (i.e., as a gestalt;
Piepers & Robbins, 2012). As such, holistic face processing is said to be qualitatively
different from the sum of its individual parts since it results in emergent features—
features that only become apparent when two or more of a face’s basic features are
processed simultaneously. For example, Tanaka and Sengco (1997) showed participants
faces with two configurations: eyes close together or eyes far apart. After presenting one
of the two faces, participants were tested for their recognition of facial features in
isolation, in a new face configuration, or in the previously presented (old) configuration.
Results revealed that participants performed best when tested with the old configuration,
followed by the new configuration, and worst with facial features (nose, mouth, or eyes)
in isolation. Moreover, while altering the spatial location of the eyes impaired recognition
of eye features, it also impaired the recognition of nose and mouth features, even though
the nose and mouth were not spatially manipulated. Together, these results suggest an
interdependency of featural and configural information to recognize faces. This
relational/configural model of face processing suggests that configural processing is
inseparable from processing individual parts of the face; emergent features of the face
arise from the interrelations between isolated features and are encoded together (see
Wallis, 2013).
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Alternatively, Piepers and Robbins (2012) proposed a holistic/part-based model,
suggesting that holistic and part-based processing are parallel processes, separable, and
equally important to face processing. In this model, part-based processing refers to the
processing of individual features of the face and is also sometimes referred to as analytic
processing (Tanaka et al., 2012). Moreover, in this model, configural processing and
holistic processing are taken to mean the same thing only if configural processing
involves the integration of all (vs. some) of the first- and second-order relations between
facial features. Although there is a lack of consensus as to the nature of holistic
processing, particularly because there is a lack of one-to-one mapping between the
theoretical construct of holistic processing and how it is measured (see Richler et al.,
2012; Richler & Gauthier, 2014; Watson & Robbins, 2014), below I review a variety of
approaches to measure and manipulate holistic processing (McKone et al., 2006; Tanaka
& Gordon, 2011).
Measuring and Manipulating Holistic Face Processing
The evidence for holistic processing of faces starts with the disproportionate
inversion effect (Yin, 1969). In a typical paradigm, faces and non-face objects are shown
both upright and inverted (i.e., upside down, or rotated 180°). In both recognition and
perception tasks, faces and other objects alike show an inversion effect: accuracy is
higher and reaction time is shorter when the stimuli are presented upright compared to
inverted. However, while the inversion effect for non-face objects is relatively small,
typically ranging from 0–8%, the inversion effect for faces is much larger, typically
ranging 20–25% (de Gelder et al., 1998; Reed et al., 2003; Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970).
The inversion effect has also been shown for judgments of target gender and facial
12

expressions of emotion, compared to non-face objects (Pallett & Meng, 2015). This
suggests that viewing inverted (vs. upright) faces makes it difficult to extract the correct
relationships between face parts, presumably because inversion disrupts holistic
processing of the face but maintains its local features, thus requiring part-based
processing of isolated features (Leder & Bruce, 1998). The disproportionate inversion
effect, however, may only provide indirect evidence of holistic processing, as it could be
argued that both non-face objects and faces are qualitatively processed the same way, but
that the magnitude of the effect is simply greater for faces (Michel et al., 2006; Sekuler et
al., 2004). However, fMRI work has shown that inverted (vs. upright) faces recruit the
ventral extrastriate regions that respond preferentially to non-face objects (e.g., houses)
instead of activating only face-selective regions (Haxby et al., 1999). Additionally, the
paradigm for the disproportionate inversion face effect is limited in that the disruption of
holistic processes is inferred from comparing accuracy and reaction time differences
between upright and inverted faces rather than manipulating holistic processes directly
(Tanaka & Simonyi, 2016).
Another approach supporting the holistic processing of faces is the composite face
task (Richler et al., 2015; Rossion, 2013; Young et al., 1987). In this task, a composite
face is created by combining the top and bottom halves of two different face identities,
and participants are asked to identify only the cued top (or bottom) half of the composite
face (the un-cued half of the face should be irrelevant to the task, in principle). When two
face parts are aligned horizontally to create a single face, participants show difficulty in
attending to the cued half of the face, as evidenced by reduced accuracy and slower
reaction times. This effect is referred to as holistic interference—difficulty in selectively
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attending to information in a cued region of a face without being influenced by
information in other regions. When the halves are horizontally misaligned or when the
face is inverted, however, holistic interference is greatly reduced or eliminated (Young et
al., 1987). The holistic interference effect has been shown with both familiar (e.g., Young
et al., 1987) and unfamiliar faces (Grand et al., 2004; Michel et al., 2006). Even first
impressions of faces, such as ratings of trustworthiness, show evidence of holistic
interference (Todorov et al., 2010). In short, the face composite task demonstrates how
difficult it can be to restrict our attention to one region of the face while ignoring other
regions of the face, suggesting that we process the faces holistically.
An additional approach to test holistic processing involves the part/whole task
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993). In this task, participants first learn name–face associations (e.g.,
Dana, Alex, Sam). Next, participants complete a memory test for face parts from the
studied name–face associations in a forced-choice recognition task. Critically, the face
part (e.g., Dana’s nose) is tested either in isolation or in the context of a whole face.
Importantly, the target and foil faces are identical, except for the face part under test (i.e.,
Dana’s nose). In other words, the target’s eyes and mouth are kept constant in target and
foil faces. The difference in part- and whole-face recognition is an index of holistic
processing: If memory for the face part (e.g., Dana’s nose) is integrated into holistic face
representation, then the recognition of the face part should be better in the whole-face (vs.
isolation) test condition, whereas if a face is remembered in terms of its constituent parts,
recognition should equivalent when presented in the whole-face (vs. isolation) condition.
Results of Tanaka and Farah (1993) reveal that recognition memory is better in the
whole-face (77%) condition compared to the isolation (65%) condition. These results are
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consistent with follow-up work that examined whether manipulating configural
information (e.g., eyes close together, eyes far apart) would interfere with the recognition
of features (e.g., a nose) when tested in isolation, with a new face configuration, and with
the old configuration (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). Results revealed that participants were
most accurate at recognizing a feature when presented in the old configuration (77%),
followed by the new configuration (72%), and least accurate when tested in isolation
(65%).
In sum, several paradigms have been used to measure or manipulate holistic
processing. The disproportionate inversion effect suggests that faces (vs. other objects)
shown inverted (vs. upright) results in less accuracy and longer reaction times. The
composite face task reveals that when two faces of different identities are made into a
composite, selectively attending to the target region of the face becomes difficult (holistic
interference) but is much less difficult when the face parts are misaligned. Moreover, the
part-whole task suggests that face parts are better remembered in the context of the whole
face compared to when presented in isolation. Across several paradigms that measure and
manipulate holistic processing, it is clear that faces are processed holistically, at least in
recognizing and identifying a face (for reviews, see Behrmann et al., 2014; McKone et
al., 2006; Tanaka & Simonyi, 2016).
Processing Emotional Facial Expressions
Like face detection, emotional facial expressions are processed quickly. For
example, results from an ERP study demonstrate that emotional information from the
face is detected with a latency as low as 80ms, and crude affective categorization can
occur as early as 100ms (Palermo & Rhodes, 2010). In perceptual tasks, emotional
15

information from a face can be detected with even very brief exposures of 10ms (Sweeny
et al., 2013). To better understand how emotional expressions are processed visually,
early work used the face composite paradigm with emotional expressions (Calder et al.,
2000; White, 2000). Using this paradigm, as described above, when two face halves were
aligned displaying conflicting emotions (e.g., happiness and anger), holistic interference
occurred, yielding less accurate recognition and longer reaction times to identify the
emotion in the cued target half of the face. In contrast, when the two face halves were
aligned and displayed the same expression, holistic facilitation (i.e., higher accuracy and
shorter reaction times) occurred (Calder et al., 2000; Wegrzyn et al., 2015). Other
researchers, however, have argued that the process of emotion recognition can be partbased—focusing on specific parts of the face—and not the integration of the parts into a
whole representation (Chen & Chen, 2010; Ellison & Massaro, 1997; Leppänen et al.,
2007). Rather than viewing emotion recognition as either holistic or part-based, other
researchers claim it may be more accurate to characterize emotional facial expression
recognition as lying on a part-based to holistic processing continuum (Farah, 1991;
Tanaka et al., 2012).
Using the composite face paradigm, Calder, Young, Keane, and Dean (2000)
showed participants faces with lower and upper parts that were either emotionally
congruent or incongruent. As expected, participants were slower to identify the
expression in the target half (top or bottom) of the face if the composite was incongruent
(vs. congruent), suggesting holistic interference (see also Wegrzyn et al., 2015).
Importantly, however, when the faces were horizontally misaligned, there was no longer
an effect of holistic interference. Results from Tanaka, Kaiser, Butler, and Le Grand
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(2012) are consistent with Calder et al. (2000). Specifically, Tanaka et al. (2012) also
used composite faces that were either emotionally congruent (e.g., happy top, happy
bottom) or incongruent (angry top, happy bottom), isolated bottom or top halves, or a
composite that had a top (or bottom) that was neutral and the other half expressing either
happiness or anger. They found that participants were most accurate in identifying
emotional expressions in the congruent condition and least accurate in the incongruent
condition (Study 1). To identify when holistic interference would first occur, Study 2
used the same manipulations but also included different exposure durations: 20ms, 60ms,
100ms, and 120ms. The effect of holistic interference for incongruent expressions
occurred as early as 20ms and 60ms for angry and happy expressions, respectively. And,
replicating Calder et al. (2000), in Study 3, Tanaka et al. (2012) found that accuracy was
higher and reaction time quicker when incongruent faces were presented misaligned (vs.
aligned). These results provide evidence of rapid holistic interference when participants
were presented with an incongruent face—information in the to-be-ignored half of the
face impaired recognition of the emotion displayed in the target half (Richler et al.,
2012). Even when the composite face paradigm uses primarily neutral faces and weakly
modulates the emotional intensity of the distractor half of the face, the holistic
interference effect grows stronger as emotional intensity increases (Gray et al., 2017).
Since deceptive (vs. genuine) facial expressions of emotions often involve incongruent
expressions that result when leakage occurs or critical facial actions are absent (e.g.,
Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; ten Brinke et al., 2012), it is possible that holistic interference
is, in part, responsible for failed detection of these deception cues, particularly when
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situational or contextual information is absent. In other words, emotional information in
one part of the face distracts from cues to deception in the other part of the face.
Visual Saliency and Distinctiveness of Features Bias Our Interpretations
Visual saliency refers to the conspicuousness of an image or image region in
relation to its surroundings, operationalized as a combination of local contrast, spatial
orientation, and energy in computational models of visual attention (Borji & Itti, 2013;
Torralba et al., 2006). These computational models mimic the response properties of
retinal neurons, lateral geniculate nucleus, thalamus, and V1 via algorithm simulation
(e.g., Walther & Koch, 2006). In facial expressions of emotion, for example, a smiling
mouth is more salient than any other region of happy and non-happy faces (Calvo &
Nummenmaa, 2008). A visually salient feature guides visual attention (Itti & Koch,
2000) and attracts gaze early (e.g., Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). Distinctiveness refers
to the degree to which a facial feature is associated with a particular facial expression but
not others, allowing an observer to recognize an expression as belonging to a particular
category (i.e., the feature is diagnostic of a particular emotion). While a smiling mouth is
the most distinctive feature of happy expressions, changes in the eye region are more
distinctive for expression of anger and fear (Calvo et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2005;
Wegrzyn et al., 2015). Distinctiveness should reduce ambiguity wherein observers
selectively attend earlier and longer to regions or features that are most diagnostic,
facilitating expression categorization accuracy. Indeed, in both static and dynamic
displays of facial expressions of emotion, eye-tracking data indicates that the eye region
is looked at earlier and longer for anger and sadness, the mouth region for happiness, the
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nose–cheek region for disgust, and the eye and mouth regions roughly equally for
surprise and fear (Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al., 2018; Schurgin et al., 2014).
However, people do not only smile when feeling happiness, but may also do so
for social or polite reasons, because of nervousness or embarrassment, or even
sarcastically (Ambadar et al., 2009; Johnston et al., 2010; Krumhuber & Manstead,
2009). Calvo, Fernández-Martín, and Nummenmaa (2013) investigated how a smiling
mouth influences observers’ perceptions of non-happy eyes. Since a smiling mouth is the
most visually salient and distinctive feature of happy expressions, they reasoned that a
smile might influence the perception of the eye region from extrafoveal (i.e., peripheral)
vision, even prior to visual fixation on the mouth. Specifically, they predicted a smiling
mouth would ‘radiate’ toward surrounding areas, ‘projecting’ an impression of happiness
even when only the non-happy eye region is foveally fixated (see Kontsevich & Tyler,
2004). Using the composite face paradigm, they found that a smiling mouth biased
observers’ ratings of non-happy eyes across three experiments. Specifically, observers
were cued to pay attention only to the eye region and were asked to rate whether happy
faces (with the Duchenne marker) or incongruent composite faces were happy or not.
Incongruent composite faces had either a smiling mouth or a Fourier scrambled mouth
(control) combined with neutral, angry, sad, fearful, or surprised eyes. Results were
consistent across three experiments: neutral eyes were most likely, and angry eyes were
least likely to be influenced by a smiling mouth. However, none of the non-happy eye
expressions were impervious to the biasing effect of the smile. This was the case when
(a) observers’ foveal (but not extrafoveal) vision for the mouth was blocked by gaze-
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contingent masking1, suggesting that extrafoveally presented smiles are accessed by
covert attention (Study 1), (b) when the smiling mouth was presented 300ms after the
eyes (Study 2), suggesting that the mouth can act against the correct initial evaluation of
non-happy eyes, and (c) when faces were horizontally aligned compared to misaligned
(Study 3).
Critical to the current investigation, Calvo, Fernández-Martín, and Nummenmaa’s
(2013) Study 3 examined whether this biasing influence of the smiling mouth on eye
expressions involves part-based or holistic processing. The smiling mouth biased
observers’ responses for both aligned and misaligned faces, but the effect was roughly
two-and-a-half times greater for aligned faces: the smiling mouth explained 70.6% of the
variance in judging the eyes as happy for aligned faces and explained only 28.1% of the
variance for misaligned faces. Additionally, reaction times for correct rejections of
incongruent faces as not happy were longer in the aligned (vs. misaligned) condition.
This suggests that the biasing effect of a smiling mouth on other regions of the face
occurs strongly when faces are perceived holistically (i.e., aligned) and relatively weakly
when faces are perceived in a part-based manner (i.e., misaligned). Together, these
results suggest that when expressions are incongruent, the smiling mouth overshadows
the information in the eye region, even when the smiling mouth is not directly fixated on,
misleading observers to interpret non-happy eyes as if they were (see also Calvo et al.,
2012, for a replication and extensions of Study 1). Together, these findings suggest that
the evaluation of deceptive emotional facial expressions, which communicate different

1

An eye-tracker monitored observer saccades. If the observer initiated a saccade away from the eye region,
the mouth region was masked by a black rectangle, eliminating the possibility of viewing the smiling
mouth with foveal vision (i.e., directly).
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emotions on the upper and lower face, may be biased by holistic interference. In
particular, distinctive features—smiles in the lower face, and anger in the upper face—
may obscure observers’ perception of other facial regions that contain cues to deception.
Mixed Expressions of Emotion Cause Processing Disfluency
A separate but related literature investigates the effects of mixed expressions,
blends of two emotions across the entire face, which elicit perceptual and categorization
difficulty and are susceptible to the influence of contextual information (e.g., Barrett &
Kensinger, 2010; Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 2001). This work seeks to understand the
mechanisms by which mixed facial expressions influence social judgments, such as trust.
For example, Winkielman, Olszanowski, and Gola (2015) presented participants with
faces that were pure anger, pure happiness, or intermediate blends (i.e., mixed) of anger
and happiness. Participants were asked to categorize the faces on either emotional
expression or gender (control). They were also asked to evaluate the faces on
attractiveness and trust. Critically, it was expected that mixed (vs. pure) expressions
would induce processing disfluency—characterized by longer reaction times, high
resource demands, or other indicators of inefficient processing—resulting in negative
affect that would be attributed to subsequent social evaluations of a target (Musch, 2013).
Results revealed that participants took longer to categorize mixed (vs. pure) faces when
judging emotional expression but not gender, suggesting that while mixed faces are
objectively ambiguous, subjective (dis)fluency is task- or evaluation-dependent.
Moreover, evaluations of attractiveness and trust followed a U-shaped curve wherein
mixed (vs. pure) faces are relatively devalued—receiving lower ratings—on these social
dimensions. This relative devaluation of mixed faces on attractiveness and trust was
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mediated by categorization disfluency. In other words, when facial expressions involve
inconsistency—akin to the leakage or absent morphology that appears in deceptive
expressions—they take longer to evaluate, suggesting a change in processing style due to
disfluency that negatively affects perceptions of trust. This effect is greatest when faces
are maximally inconsistent and weaker when inconsistency is subtle—as in deceptive
emotional expressions. Using a similar paradigm to Winkielman et al. (2015), findings
from Olszanowski et al. (2018) suggest that trust judgments are influenced by both facial
features related to valence—positively valenced features are judged as trustworthy—and
social motivation—faces high in social dominance, such as anger, are judged as
threatening, untrustworthy, and induce avoidance (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008).
Specifically, participants rated pure happy (vs. sad) faces as more trustworthy (valencerelevant information) and pure sad (vs. angry) faces as more trustworthy (motivationrelevant information). These effects were qualified by processing disfluency: happy–sad
mixed faces were rated as relatively less trustworthy, whereas anger–sadness mixed faces
were not. This suggests that when forming impressions of trust, disfluency is more likely
to combine with valence-related (vs. motivation-related) features of the face.
Relatedly, observers’ affective reactions depend on the type of incongruent
(different emotions in the upper compared to lower face) expression. For example, Calvo,
Gutiérrez-García, and Líbano (2018) explored factors that contribute to the
discrimination between congruent happy and incongruent expressions. Specifically, they
examined the relative contributions of visual saliency, distinctiveness, facial action units,
and affective valence of congruent happy expressions and incongruent (e.g., smiling
mouth, angry eyes) expressions. They found that observers judged congruent happy faces
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as most pleasant, followed by smiling mouths with surprised or neutral eyes, those with
fearful or sad eyes, those disgusted eyes, and those with angry eyes were rated as least
pleasant. In follow-up work, affective valence—participants’ ratings of how emotionally
positive or negative the faces were—was the strongest predictor of discrimination
performance between happy and non-happy incongruent faces, controlling for facial
action units and other physical properties (Del Líbano et al., 2018). Similar to subjective
disfluency reducing impressions of trustworthiness, negative affective reactions to
incongruent expressions predict increased discrimination between happy and non-happy
faces. Thus, an alternative hypothesis might be that holistic processing facilitates the
subjective experience of disfluency when presented with an incongruent face. This
experience may improve deception detection accuracy relative to a condition where
holistic processing is interrupted.
The Present Research
Observers reliably recognize so-called basic facial expressions of emotion as
distinct emotional categories above chance (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2016) that elicit
predictable subsequent emotional and behavioral responses (van Kleef & Côté, 2022).
Not all emotional facial expressions, however, reveal an expresser’s underlying emotion,
and may be used to intentionally mislead an observer (Ekman, 2003). A growing body of
evidence suggests that genuine and deceptive facial expressions of emotion differ (e.g.,
Dopson et al., 1984; Hess & Kleck, 1990). Although these differences—such as leakage
of an underlying emotion or absence of appropriate morphology—have been identified
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; ten Brinke et al., 2012), results are mixed as to whether
observers can reliably discern deceptive from genuine expressions (e.g., McLellan et al.,
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2010; Zloteanu et al., 2019). One potential explanation is that cues to deception on the
face may be weak or inconsistent (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011).
Accordingly, some researchers have argued that deception detection accuracy may be
improved if cues were made stronger and more perceptible. I consider holistic processing
as a visual mechanism by which cues to emotional deception on the face may become
more or less obvious to the perceiver.
On the one hand, research on social impressions of mixed facial expressions (i.e.,
full-faced blends of different emotions) suggests that these faces are rated as relatively
less attractive and less trustworthy than pure faces, an effect mediated by observers’
subjective experience of processing disfluency (Olszanowski et al., 2018; Winkielman et
al., 2015). Indeed, impressions of mistrust and deception are strongly correlated (e.g., Au
& Wong, 2019). Thus, these mixed expressions, albeit artificially produced, are
conceptually similar to deceptive expressions, and would suggest that subjective
disfluency may serve as a potential cue to deception in the evaluation of emotional facial
expression veracity (Olszanowski et al., 2018; Winkielman et al., 2015). Alternatively, it
is possible that the emergent perceptual features of faces that involve inconsistent
emotional expression in the upper and lower halves of the face obscure this cue to
deception. Since people process faces holistically (Richler & Gauthier, 2014) and rapidly
attend to diagnostic regions of the face when a particular emotion is expressed (Calvo,
Fernández-Martín, et al., 2018), one region of the face may bias (Calvo, FernándezMartín, et al., 2013) or interfere (Tanaka et al., 2012) with people’s ability to perceive
these potential cues to deception in other regions of the face (Iwasaki & Noguchi, 2016).
Consistent with this hypothesis is evidence that interrupting holistic processing by
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misaligning incongruent faces results in higher emotion recognition accuracy and faster
reaction times in a cued part of the face (Calder et al., 2000; Tanaka et al., 2012) and
substantially reduces the biasing effect one region of the face has on the other (Calvo et
al., 2012; Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al., 2013). Thus, since there is some evidence that
deception emotions involve leakage that occurs in either the upper or lower half of the
face (Porter et al., 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008), interrupting holistic processing may
increase observers’ ability to identify the incongruence among the face halves by
reducing holistic interference and the biasing effect of one half of the face on the other. In
the current set of studies, I pit these alternative hypotheses against each other (see Table
1), borrowing insights from vision science on how people visually process facial
expressions of emotion to test whether interrupting holistic processing improves or
impairs the ability to identify deceptive emotional expressions.
Table 1: Competing Hypotheses
Hypothesis

Prediction

Pattern of
Results

Subjective Disfluency
Account

Subjective disfluency experienced
from mixed expressions may serve
as a potential cue to deception in
the evaluation of emotional facial
expression veracity

Aligned (vs.
misaligned)
incongruent
(or posed)
expressions
would be
rated as less
genuine

Holistic Processing
Account

One region of the face may bias or
interfere with perceiving cues to
deception. Interrupting holistic
processing reduces this bias,
increasing the ability to perceive
incongruence among face halves.

Misaligned
(vs. aligned)
incongruent
(or posed)
expressions
would be
rated as less
genuine
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Chapter Two: Pilot Study
The Pilot Study aimed to examine whether disrupting holistic processing would
enhance or impair observers’ ability to detect (artificially created) incongruence in
emotional facial expressions. If incongruence, as a proxy cue to deception, is obscured by
holistic processing (Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al., 2013; Iwasaki & Noguchi, 2016;
Tanaka et al., 2012), I would expect that observers’ ratings of genuineness for
incongruent expressions would be lower for misaligned compared to aligned faces. Such
an effect would not be expected for congruent expressions: Tanaka et al. (Experiment 3;
2012) found that for congruent angry and happy expressions, there was no difference in
emotion identification accuracy when comparing aligned to misaligned faces (c.f., Calder
et al., 2000; White, 2000). This pattern of results would suggest that by misaligning the
face, versatile action units which are activated during inconsistent expressions (Gosselin
et al., 2010) no longer obscure observers’ ability to perceive the ‘leakage’ of reliable
action units that serve as a cue to deception. Alternatively, if holistic processing
facilitates the subjective experience of disfluency and leads to negative social evaluation
for facial expression incongruence, as for mixed faces (Olszanowski et al., 2018;
Winkielman et al., 2015), I expect that this experience may improve deception detection
accuracy, compared to when holistic processing is interrupted by misalignment.
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Method
Participants and Design
Seventy-six participants (50 females, 21 males, 3 non-binary, 2 preferred not to
answer) were initially recruited from the University of Denver and received course credit
for their participation (Mage = 20.93, SDage = 6.13, range = 18–29). The sample was
composed of White (75.38%), Asian (5.20%), mixed-race (3.90%), Hispanic (3.90%),
Black (2.60%), Native American (1.30%), and 1.30% preferred not to say. A 2
(Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Emotional Congruence: congruent, incongruent)
within-subjects design was used. Sixty-seven participants completed the study. A
sensitivity power analysis indicated that with a sample size of n = 67, 144 trials, and  =
0.5 among trials, we had 95% power to detect an effect as small as 2 = .08, which is
considered a medium effect by Cohen (2013) standards.
Stimuli
Four faces of white men and four faces of white women were adopted from the
NimStim face set (Tottenham et al., 2009). Previous work created linear interpolations
(i.e., morphs) of emotional expression for each face using Fantamorph software
(Mihalache et al., 2021). For the present study, each of the eight target faces expressed
happiness or anger at three levels of emotional intensity: 20%, 40%, and 60%. Happy and
angry expressions were used based on following previous research using a similar
paradigm (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2012). Moreover, distinctive features—smiles in the lower
face or anger in the upper face—may obscure observers’ perception of cues to deception
(e.g., Calvo et al., 2013). Faces were first cropped at the bridge of the nose horizontally to
make stimuli that manipulated emotional congruence. Faces were emotionally congruent
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when the upper and lower half of the face displayed happiness. Faces were emotionally
incongruent when the face displayed anger in the upper face and happiness in the lower
face. No faces displayed anger in the lower half of the face. Given the context prompt for
the procedure of the current study (see below), anger was displayed only in the upper face
since these action units are considered reliable (vs. versatile) action units (Gosselin et al.,
2010; Mehu et al., 2012), and because non-Duchenne or fake smiles typically do not
involve the activation of orbicularis oculi (cheek raiser) in the upper face (e.g., Ekman &
Friesen, 1982; but see also Gunnery et al., 2013). To create a sufficient number of
emotional congruent and incongruent stimuli, multiple levels of expression intensity in
the upper and lower face were fully crossed. In other words, the lower face displayed
happiness at 20%, 40%, or 60% and was combined with all possibilities in the upper face:
happiness (20%, 40%, or 60%) or anger (20%, 40%, or 60%). To manipulate holistic
processing, each of these faces was presented either aligned, wherein the face halves
created an intact composite, or misaligned, wherein the faces were horizontally
misaligned with a 30% offset (see Figure 1). A thin black line was inserted in between
the upper and lower half of the face at the middle of the nose for all faces, as previous
work indicates that the absence of a delineation between the upper and lower face halves
may artificially inflate the magnitude of the composite-face effect (Gray et al., 2017;
Rossion & Retter, 2015). In total, each of the four targets had 36 variations of face
alignment, emotional (in)congruence, and intensity, resulting in a total of 144 stimuli
faces for the present study. Importantly, since each target presented every possible
combination of congruent and incongruent expression, extraneous factors that might
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affect observers’ genuineness ratings (e.g., attractiveness) were held constant across all
levels of emotional congruence and face alignment.

Figure 1. Example stimuli from the Pilot Study depicting an aligned face (left) or
misaligned face (right) to manipulate holistic processing. In (A) upper and lower face
feature a congruent expression of happiness at 60% intensity in both the upper and lower
face. In (B) upper face is anger at 60% intensity with the lower face at 60% happiness.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants first completed a demographic
questionnaire. Specifically, participants indicated their age, gender, ethnicity,
undergraduate major, whether English is their native language, whether there was any
reason to not use their data, if they were currently under the influence of any substances
that might impair their ability to complete the study, how tired they were before the study
(1 - not at all to 4 - very tired), how they were feeling (1 - very poor to 4 - very well), and
whether there is anything else that might affect their performance. Participants were then
redirected to a webpage to complete the primary study, detailed below.
Context Prompt. Participants were first informed that facial expressions may
reflect genuine emotion but can also be faked or posed. Specifically, they were told that a
genuine expression occurs when somebody smiles and really feels happy, whereas a
faked expression is when somebody displays a particular emotional expression without
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feeling that emotion or adopts a different emotional expression to cover up how they
actually feel. As an example, they were told that people may choose to cover up feelings
of anger by expressing a more socially appropriate emotion, like happiness, instead. Next,
they were told that while people find it easy to smile with their mouth even when they
don’t feel happy, the upper part of the face can provide useful cues to deception. This is
consistent with previous research that indicates AUs in the upper (vs. lower) face are
more difficult to voluntarily control, resulting in activation of unintended AUs or
‘leakage’ (Gosselin et al., 2010; Mehu et al., 2012). Participants were told that the upper
face could indicate whether the expression reflects genuine happiness or if the person is
trying to cover their feelings of anger with fake happiness. They were then told that
during the study, they would be rating how genuine various facial expressions looked to
them. Consistent with previous procedures in holistic processing of emotion with the
composite face paradigm (e.g., Calder et al., 2000; Tanaka et al., 2012), participants were
cued to pay attention to only one half of the face. In the context of the current study,
participants were instructed that because cues to veracity will appear in the upper facial
region, they should only pay attention to the upper face when making their judgments.
Instructions were as follows:

In the following study, you will be rating facial expressions. Sometimes facial
expressions reflect genuinely felt emotion, but other times expressions are faked
or posed (e.g., to be polite). An example of a genuine expression is when
somebody smiles and they really feel happy, like when they get a present or see
something funny. An example of a faked expression is when somebody smiles
without feeling any emotion, or to cover up another emotion they actually feel.
For example, people may choose to cover up feelings of anger by expressing a
more socially-appropriate emotion, like happiness, instead. People find it easy to
smile with their mouth, even when they do not feel happy, but the upper part of
the face can provide useful cues to deception. Specifically, the upper face will
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indicate whether the expression reflects genuine happiness or if the person is
trying to cover their feelings of anger with fake happiness. For the following
facial expressions, you will rate how genuinely happy they look. In this task, pay
attention only to the upper face to make your judgments.

Practice Trials. Prior to beginning the primary experiment, participants were
presented with examples (of a target not used in the primary study), which included faces
aligned and misaligned. Participants then rated the faces they had just seen on a scale
from -7 (completely fake) to +7 (completely genuine), with the prompt, “As an attempt to
look happy, how genuine does this expression look to you?”.
Primary Experiment. Each trial began with a fixation point in the center of the
screen presented for a randomly determined duration of 500, 600, or 700ms. Participants
were then presented with a target face and rated each on a scale from -7 (completely fake)
to +7 (completely genuine), with the prompt, “As an attempt to look happy, how genuine
does this expression look to you?” Each of the 144 faces was presented individually in
random order. Participants could spend as much time as they needed on each trial to
make their judgment (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. A sequence of two trials during the primary experiment. The fixation cross was
displayed for either 500, 600, or 700ms, followed by an aligned or misaligned face
wherein participants were asked to make their genuineness judgment.
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Additional Judgments. 2 After the primary task, participants were also asked
how difficult they found the task on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) (M =
2.57, SD = 1.08, n = 21), provided a dichotomous judgment of which type of face made it
easier to detect genuine happiness (aligned: 57.10%, misaligned: 42.90%, n = 21), and
completed an open-ended question about whether they had any guesses for what the
primary experiment was about. Lastly, participants were thanked for their participation
and debriefed.
Results
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Congruence: congruent, incongruent)
within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ ratings of genuineness. 3 While
results revealed no main effect of alignment, F(1, 66) = 2.12, p = .15, p2 = .03, there was
a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 66) = 332.74, p < .001, p2 = .83.
Specifically, congruent faces (M = 0.88, SE = 0.16) were rated as more genuine than
incongruent faces (M = -2.19, SE = 0.17). The main effect of congruence, however, was
qualified by a significant alignment  congruence interaction, F(1, 66) = 41.02, p < .001,
p2 = .38. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were performed to examine the interaction.
For congruent faces, misaligned faces (M = 1.16, SE = 0.18) were rated as more genuine
than aligned faces (M = 0.62, SE = 0.16), t(66) = 4.51, p < .001, d = 0.55, contrary to my
hypothesis. For incongruent faces, misaligned faces (M = -2.33, SE = 0.18) were rated as
less genuine than aligned faces (M = -2.05, SE = 0.18), t(66) = -2.74, p = .008, d = -0.33,

2

Most participants did not complete the follow-up questions that followed the primary experiment. This
was the case for Study 1 and Study 2, as well.
3

See Appendix A for additional analyses that include emotional intensity as an independent variable.
Appendix A also includes an analysis of observers’ reaction time to making genuineness ratings.

32

consistent with the notion that interrupting holistic processing improved the detection of
emotional incongruence, as in deceptive expressions of emotion (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. The effect of emotional congruence and alignment on observers’ genuineness
ratings in the Pilot Study. Error bars represent  1 standard error.
Discussion
Consistent with the hypothesis that interrupting holistic processing would
improve the detection of emotional incongruence, incongruent faces were rated as less
genuine when misaligned (vs. aligned). This contrasts with what I would expect if
disfluency could serve as a reliable cue to expression incongruence; if that were the case,
aligned (vs. misaligned) incongruent faces would be given lower genuineness ratings.
Thus, when focusing on the effect of alignment on the evaluation of incongruent faces,
specifically, results are consistent with improved deception detection by interrupting
holistic processing. Neither of the proposed mechanisms, however, would have predicted
that congruent faces would be rated as more genuine when misaligned (vs. aligned). This
finding is inconsistent with previous research by Tanaka et al. (2012), who found that
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alignment did not affect accuracy in identifying congruent angry and happy faces. While
speculative, misaligned (vs. aligned) congruent faces may have been rated as more
genuine because, as the instructions stated, “People find it easy to smile with their mouth,
even when they do not feel happy, but the upper part of the face can provide useful cues
to deception.” It is possible that misaligned faces made the task of identifying
genuineness of happy expressions in the upper face easier, particularly if participants
were already suspicious of deception occurring. This, however, contrasts sharply with
previous findings on emotional recognition with aligned and misaligned faces: when two
face halves are aligned and display the same expressions, observers demonstrate higher
accuracy and shorter reaction times (i.e., holistic facilitation; Calder et al., 2000;
Wegrzyn et al., 2015).
While these results provide preliminary evidence that interrupting holistic
processing may enhance observers’ ability to detect incongruence in emotional facial
expressions, cautious interpretations are warranted. First, participants were asked, “As an
attempt to look happy, how genuine does this expression look to you?”. While consistent
with the contextual prompt participants were given in the study instructions, this question
format may confound participants’ recognition of happiness with perceptions of facial
expression genuineness. In other words, given the instructions provided, it is unclear
whether participants were rating targets’ level of happiness (or lack of anger), or the
genuineness of those expressions. Also, while the pilot study displayed faces until
participants responded, previous research has limited presentation duration in composite
face task to be fixed between 500–1000ms (see meta-analysis, Richler & Gauthier, 2014).
Although it appears that holistic interference occurs rapidly (e.g., Richler et al., 2012;
34

Tanaka et al., 2012), longer presentation durations such as 1200ms may eliminate holistic
interference effects, presumably because participants can voluntarily engage in a partbased processing style (Calder et al., 2000; Hole, 1994). Since both holistic interference
and disfluency effects appear to occur on a short time course (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2012;
Winkielman et al., 2015), a better test might present face stimuli for a fixed, shorter
duration.
Additionally, the pilot study manipulated emotional expression incongruence in
the upper (but not lower) face. Namely, anger appeared in the upper face only. While this
manipulation mimics previous research (e.g., Calvo et al., 2012; Tanaka et al., 2012), it is
important to consider how incongruence in the lower face may affect observers’
judgments of facial expression genuineness. For example, Calvo and Fernández-Martín
(2012) found that the eye region is influenced by the expression conveyed by the mouth
in incongruent composite faces, but that a smile produced a larger influence than a sad or
angry mouth did. If interrupting holistic processing enhances observers’ ability to detect
facial expression incongruence, this should be the case whether the apparent
incongruence is in the upper or lower face. Thus, I revised the Pilot Study procedures to
generate Study 1, in light of these considerations.
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Chapter Three: Study 1
Method
Participants and Design
Participants (n = 96, 77 females, 23 males) were initially recruited from the
University of Denver participant pool (Mage = 19.60, SDage = 1.33, range = 18–23). This
sample was composed of White (62.96%), mixed-race (11.11%), Hispanic (12.04%),
Asian (1.85%), Native American (1.85%), and Black (1.85%), and 8.34% preferred not to
say. A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Emotional Congruence: congruent,
incongruent) within-subjects design was used. Twenty-one participants did not complete
the study. The smallest effect detected in the Pilot study was 2 = 0.38, a large effect. A
sensitivity power analysis indicated that with a sample size of n = 75, 128 trials, and  =
.50 among trials, we had 95% power to detect an effect as small as 2 = .07, which is
considered a medium effect by Cohen (2013) standards.
Stimuli
Study 1 used the same target faces (Mihalache et al., 2021; Tottenham et al.,
2009) as in the Pilot study. However, the following changes were made to address the
limitations of the Pilot study. In contrast to the Pilot study, which only manipulated
emotional congruence and incongruence in the upper face (i.e., anger in the upper face
only), Study 1 manipulated emotional incongruence in the upper and lower face.
Specifically, emotionally congruent faces featured either anger or happiness in both the
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upper and lower face. Emotionally incongruent faces are those that feature either anger in
the upper face with happiness in the lower face, or vice versa (see Figure 4). Thus, both
possibilities of emotional incongruence (i.e., upper anger/lower happy; upper
happy/lower angry) were included. While the Pilot study used three levels of emotional
intensity (20%, 40%, 60%), Study 1 simplified the design with two levels of intensity
(20%, 60%). Like the Pilot Study, every possible combination of emotional intensity and
emotion was used to create stimuli. The manipulation of holistic processing was the same
as the Pilot study: each face was presented either aligned, wherein the faces halves create
an intact composite, or misaligned, wherein the faces were horizontally misaligned with a
30% offset. Like the Pilot study, a thin black line was inserted in between the upper and
lower face at the middle of the nose (Gray et al., 2017; Rossion & Retter, 2015). In total,
128 stimuli faces were used. Again, each target presented every possible combination of
aligned and misaligned congruent and incongruent expressions, reducing the possibility
that extraneous factors (e.g., facial attractiveness) could explain observers’ genuineness
ratings.

Figure 4. Example incongruent stimuli used in Study 1. In the top row, an aligned (left)
and misaligned (right) face with anger at 60% intensity in the upper face and happiness at
60% intensity in the lower face. In the bottom row, an aligned (left) and misaligned
(right) face with happiness at 60% intensity in the upper face and anger at 60% intensity
in the lower face.
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Procedure
Like the Pilot study, participants first completed a demographic questionnaire,
indicating their age, gender, ethnicity, undergraduate major, whether English is their
native language, whether there was any reason to not use their data, if they were currently
under the influence of any substances that might impair their ability to complete the
study, how tired they were before the study (1 - not at all to 4 - very tired), how they are
feeling (1 - very poor to 4 - very well), and whether there is anything else that might
affect their performance. Participants were then redirected to a webpage to complete the
primary study, detailed below.
Initial Instructions. Participants were informed that facial expressions may not
reflect genuine emotion but can be faked or posed. Specifically, they were told that a
genuine expression occurs when somebody displays a facial expression and feels that
emotion internally, whereas a fake expression occurs when someone displays a facial
expression but does not feel that emotion internally. They were then told that during the
study, they would be rating how genuine various facial expressions looked to them. Thus,
in contrast to the Pilot study, they were not cued to focus on the upper or lower half of the
face and were not told what emotion the expresser intended to communicate. Rather,
participants were simply asked to evaluate the genuineness of the expression presented.
Instructions were as follows:
In the following study, you will be rating facial expressions. Sometimes facial
expressions reflect genuinely felt emotion, but other times expressions are faked
or posed (e.g., to be polite). An example of a genuine expression is when
somebody smiles and they really feel happy, like when they get a present or see
something funny. An example of a faked expression is when somebody smiles
without feeling any emotion, or to cover up another emotion they actually feel.
For example, people may choose to cover up feelings of anger by expressing a
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more socially-appropriate emotion, like happiness, instead. For the following
facial expressions, you will rate how genuine they look.
Practice Trials. Prior to beginning the primary experiment, participants were
presented with examples (a target not used in the primary study), which included a face
that was aligned and misaligned. Participants then rated the face they had just seen on a
scale from -7 (completely fake) to +7 (completely genuine) with the prompt, “How
genuine did that expression look to you?” (Dawel et al., 2017; Miolla et al., 2021).
Primary Experiment. Each trial began with a fixation cross at the center of the
screen for 500ms. Participants were then presented with a target face for 500ms.
Participants were then prompted on the next screen, “How genuine did that expression
look to you?” and indicated their response on a scale from -7 (completely fake) to +7
(completely genuine) (see Figure 5). Participants completed each of the 128 trials in
random order.
Additional Judgments.4 After the primary task, participants were also asked how
difficult they found the task on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) (M = 2.44,
SD = 1.04, n = 25), provided a dichotomous judgment of which face type made it easier
to detect genuineness (aligned:92%, misaligned: 8.00%, n = 25), and completed an openended question about whether they had any guesses for what the primary experiment was
about. Lastly, participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed.

4

Like the Pilot Study, many participants did not complete the follow-up questions after the primary
experiment.
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Figure 5. One example trial in Study 1. A fixation cross was displayed for 500ms,
followed by a face for 500ms, and then a response screen without the face displayed until
participant response.
Results
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Congruence: congruent, incongruent)
within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ ratings of genuineness5. Results
revealed a main effect of alignment, F(1, 78) = 6.75, p = .011, p2 = .08. Specifically,
misaligned faces (M = -0.17, SD = 3.80) were rated as less genuine than aligned faces (M
= 0.48, SD = 3.91). Results also revealed a main effect of congruence, F(1, 78) = 39.20, p
< .001, p2 = .33. Specifically, incongruent faces (M = -0.12, SD = 3.81) were rated as
less genuine than congruent faces (M = 0.43, SD = 3.91). There was not, however, an
alignment  congruence interaction, F(1, 78) = 0.01, p = .91 (see Figure 6). To test the

5

See Appendix B for additional analyses that also include emotion type and emotional intensity as
independent variables. Critically, these variables did not interact with alignment, ps > .129.
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focal hypothesis, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were conducted. For incongruent
faces, misaligned faces (M = -0.44, SE = 0.19) were rated as less genuine than aligned
faces (M = 0.20, SE = 0.15), t(78) = 2.48, p = .015, d = 0.28, consistent with the
hypothesis that disrupting holistic processing may improve detection of cues to deception
on the face. For congruent faces, misaligned faces (M = 0.10, SE = 0.20) were also rated
as less genuine than aligned faces (M = 0.75, SE = 0.17), t(78) = 2.54, p = .013, d = 0.29.

Figure 6. The effect of emotional congruence and alignment on observers’ mean ratings
of genuineness in Study 1. Error bars represent  1 standard error.
Discussion
The pattern of results observed in Study 1 bear both similarities and differences
from those observed in the Pilot study. In both studies, I found that incongruent
expressions were rated as less genuine when misaligned (vs. aligned), consistent with the
hypothesis that interrupting holistic processing would improve the detection of emotional
congruence (Calder et al., 2000; Calvo et al., 2012; Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al.,
2013; Tanaka et al., 2012). This pattern results do not appear to support the hypothesis
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that mixed expressions result in subjective disfluency, serving as a cue to deception in the
evaluation of emotional facial expression genuineness (Olszanowski et al., 2018;
Winkielman et al., 2015). If so, aligned (vs. misaligned) incongruent expressions would
have been rated as less genuine. However, congruent expressions were rated as more
genuine when misaligned (vs. aligned) in the Pilot study, while the opposite effect was
found in Study 1. Specifically, Study 1 found that both congruent and incongruent
expressions were rated as less genuine when misaligned compared to aligned. Thus, the
results of Study 1 suggest that misaligning faces generally decreases their genuineness
ratings, irrespective of their emotional congruence.
Like the Pilot Study, the effect of alignment on congruent expressions was
unexpected. One possibility is that misaligned (vs. aligned) faces are perceived as less
familiar, bizarre, or untrustworthy when making ratings of genuineness. Ratings of
genuineness on a continuous scale in the present research differ from previous research
using similar paradigms wherein the task is typically emotion recognition accuracy on a
dichotomous scale (e.g., Calder et al., 2000; Tanaka et al., 2012). Another possibility is
that for congruent expressions, aligned (vs. misaligned) faces result in holistic
facilitation, as previous research has found that when two faces halves are aligned and
show the same expression, participants demonstrate higher emotion recognition accuracy
and faster reaction times (Calder et al., 2000; Wegrzyn et al., 2015; White, 2000). It is
possible that gains in accuracy and speed conferred from holistic facilitation are lost
when congruent faces are misaligned and therefore interrupt holistic processing.
Conversely, misaligning incongruent faces reduces holistic interference among the face
halves, resulting in greater accuracy and reaction time (e.g., Calder et al., 2000; Tanaka et
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al., 2012). In other words, holistic processing facilitates the perception of emotional
congruence, whereas interrupting holistic processing facilitates the perception of
emotional incongruence.
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Chapter Four: Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to extend and further explore the findings of the Pilot
Study and Study 1 by investigating whether disrupting holistic processing would affect
observers’ ability to detect emotional expression genuineness with a set of real and
spontaneous genuine and deceptive (posed) expressions. The Pilot study and Study 1 are
both limited in that they use artificially produced stimuli; it is not clear whether the
effects observed in either study would be generalizable to real (and posed) emotional
facial expressions. For example, Namba et al. (2018) had participants discern whether
targets were showing and feeling a given emotion for facial expressions of amusement,
disgust, sadness, and surprise. Results indicated that genuine expressions were evaluated
as more felt than posed expressions. Using stimuli with greater ecological validity would
result in a more generalizable test of the current competing hypotheses. Accordingly, in
Study 2, a new set of stimuli featuring real and posed expressions of happiness and anger
were used. Additionally, we explore the effect of instruction and emotion type (happy,
anger) on observers’ ratings of genuineness. Specifically, since happiness is associated
with higher levels of trust and anger with lower levels of trust (Oosterhof & Todorov,
2008), these emotional expressions may have different effects on observers’ perceived
genuineness (Centorrino et al., 2015).
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Method
Participants and Design
Participants (n = 76, 67 female, 6 male, 4 non-binary) were recruited from the
University of Denver and received course credit for their participation (Mage = 19.24,
SDage = 0.99, range = 18–22). The sample was composed of White (57.69%), Hispanic
(21.80%), mixed-race (8.97%), Asian (5.13%), Black (1.28%), Indian (1.28%), and
2.56% preferred not to say. Study 2 used a 2 (Veracity: genuine, posed)  2 (Emotion:
happiness, anger)  2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  3 (Block: randomized,
happiness, anger) within-subjects design. A sensitivity power analysis indicated that with
a sample size of n = 76, 208 trials, and  = 0.5 among trials, we had 95% power to detect
2

an effect as small as  = .07, which is considered a medium effect by Cohen (2013)
standards.
Stimuli
The Padova Emotional Dataset of Facial Expressions (PEDFE) was used for
facial expression stimuli (Miolla et al., 2021). The PEDFE features fifty-five targets
displaying genuine (n = 707) and posed (n = 751) facial expressions of the six basic
emotions. The PEDFE has several advantages over other stimuli sets. Namely, each of
the six emotions is displayed genuinely and posed for each target, each elicited with a
total of fifteen emotion tasks for the six basic emotions. Moreover, all stimuli were
validated by asking targets to rate each clip according to the emotion, genuineness, and
intensity of their facial expression. All distracting variables from the background (e.g.,
hair, clothes) have been removed from each stimulus (see Figure 7). Stimuli were also
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rated by a separate set of observers, who were asked to identify the emotion displayed,
whether it was genuine or fake, and how intense the expression appeared.

Figure 7. Peak intensity images of genuine (top row) and simulated (bottom row)
expressions of six emotions included in the PEDFE. Adopted from Miolla, Cardaioli, and
Scarpazza (2021).
Targets were filmed with a hidden camera and a laptop webcam while watching
emotional videos (i.e., emotion elicitation tasks) while alone in a room and were asked to
rate the emotional valence of videos. As a cover story, targets were told that the webcam
was recording eye movements and pupil dilation while performing the valence rating
task. After completing several emotion elicitation tasks, targets identified which emotion
they felt, rated how genuine the emotion was from -7 (completely not genuine) to +7
(completely genuine), and how intense the emotion was from 0 (none) to 9 (strong).
Videos of genuine expressions were then chosen only if both the emotional expression
matched FACS coding criteria and targets’ self-reports (e.g., experienced happiness with
a high level of genuineness). Videos of posed expressions were created after the emotion
elicitation tasks. Specifically, participants were asked to pose each of the six basic
emotions several times with different intensity modulations.
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Stimuli Selection. First, targets (n = 55) displaying genuine expressions of
happiness (n = 214), posed expressions of happiness (n = 156), genuine expressions of
anger (n = 76), and posed expressions of anger (n = 90) were initially considered for
inclusion. Expressions of happiness and anger only were selected to conceptually map on
to the Pilot Study and Study 1. However, some of the stimuli were not filmed from a
frontal view. As mentioned above, targets were filmed with a hidden camera or a laptop
webcam. Manipulating holistic processing by misaligning the face would not be possible
for images filmed from a non-frontal view. Consequently, a research assistant first coded
whether targets were filmed from a frontal view (n = 265 expressions) or not (n = 271
expressions). This resulted in 38 unique targets with a frontal view and the following
number of expressions: genuine happiness (n = 105), posed happiness (n = 94), genuine
anger (n = 27), and posed anger (n = 27). Some targets had several genuine and posed
expressions of happiness and anger. For example, one target had five expressions of
genuine happiness, four expressions of posed happiness, five expressions of genuine
anger, and four expressions of posed anger. To maintain consistency across emotion and
veracity conditions, targets (n = 13) were selected if they had at least one of each type of
expression: genuine happiness, genuine anger, posed happiness, posed anger. For targets
who had several versions of a given expression, one was randomly selected.
Since expression stimuli were originally in video form, a static image for each
expression was chosen. To choose a static image of each expression for each target, a
research assistant and I independently coded a range of video frames that depicted the
emotional expression being displayed at full intensity. Specifically, we independently
indicated at which video frame the peak intensity emotion began and ended, thus creating
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a range of frames to subsequently choose from. Initially, the range we each independently
indicated overlapped for 90.38% of expressions. For the remaining 9.62% of expressions
where the range did not overlap, videos (n = 5) were independently evaluated again and
subsequently indicated overlapping ranges 6. For each expression, a single frame was
chosen from the overlapping ranges of peak intensity coding. Thus, for each of the
thirteen targets, one frame of each emotion (happy, anger) and veracity (genuine, posed)
was chosen for a total of 52 images. Consequently, since each expresser provided two
genuine and two posed expressions of happiness and anger, extraneous factors that might
affect observers’ ratings of genuineness (e.g., gender, attractiveness) were held constant
across genuine and posed stimuli.
Manipulating Holistic Processing. Original images were considered ‘aligned’,
and a 30% offset was used to create horizontally misaligned versions of each expression.
A thin black line was inserted in between the upper and lower half of the face at the
middle of the nose of all stimuli faces (Gray et al., 2017; Rossion & Retter, 2015). Thus,
there were 52 aligned faces and 52 misaligned faces for a total of 104 face stimuli (see
Figure 8).

Figure 8. Example stimuli used in Study 2. In the top row, an aligned (left) and
misaligned (right) face genuine expression of happiness. In the bottom row, an aligned
(left) and misaligned (right) posed anger.
6

Disagreement for this set of targets appeared to be because the targets displayed a peak intensity facial
expression more than once during the video.
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Stimuli Manipulation Check. With a final set of thirteen unique targets, each
displaying one version of genuine happiness, genuine anger, posed happiness, and posed
anger, a manipulation check was conducted to determine if genuine expressions were
previously rated as more genuine than posed expressions. Specifically, all stimuli were
rated by a separate set of observers, who were asked to identify the emotion displayed,
whether it was genuine or fake, and how intense the expression appeared as part of the
PEDFE database (Miolla et al., 2021). An independent samples t-test revealed that
genuine expressions (M = 1.78, SD = 1.52) were previously rated as more genuine than
posed expressions (M = -1.18, SD = 2.43), t(50) = 5.29, p < .001, d = 0.74.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed the same demographic
questionnaire as the Pilot Study and Study 1. Participants were then redirected to a
webpage to complete the primary study. First, participants were told that they would be
rating facial expressions. In contrast to the Pilot Study and Study 1, instructions were:

Sometimes facial expression reflect genuine felt emotions, but other times
expressions are faked or posed. A genuine expression is when somebody displays
the emotion they feel internally. A fake expression is when somebody displays an
emotion but does not feel that emotion internally. For the following expressions,
you will be rating how genuine or fake they look.
Practice Trials. Participants were shown then shown examples (of a target not
used in the primary study) of an aligned and a misaligned face. Then, they were then
shown those same faces for 500ms each and asked to rate them on a scale of -7
(completely fake) to +7 (completely genuine), with the prompt, “How genuine did that
expression look to you?”. Participants then proceeded to the primary experiment, where
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they completed the randomized block and then the happy block and angry block (or vice
versa) as described below.
Primary Experiment. After the two practice trials, participants began the
primary experiment. Specifically, each participant began with a no context block that
presented all faces (n = 104) in random order. Unlike the previous experiments, each trial
did not begin with a fixation point. Since these stimuli were not videotaped from a
consistent or systematic distance for each participant, a fixation cross would not always
appear at the center of the face. Instead, after a 500ms delay, a face was shown for 500ms
and then participants were asked to rate each face on a scale from -7 (completely fake) to
+7 (completely genuine), with the prompt, “How genuine did that expression look to
you?”. Each of the 104 faces were presented in random order. Participants could spend as
much time as they needed on each trial to make their judgments, but the face was not
present after 500ms (see Figure 9). After completing the randomized block, participants
completed the happy block and the angry block in randomized order. In the happy block,
participants were told: “In the next part of the study, you will be rating expressions of
happiness. Specifically, you will be rating how genuine or fake each expression of
happiness looks.” Participants then completed the same procedure as the randomized
block for each of the happy faces only (n = 52). Likewise, in the angry block, participants
were told, “In the next part of the study, you will be rating expressions of anger.
Specifically, you will be rating how genuine or fake each expression of anger looks.”
Participants then completed the same procedure as the randomized block for each of the
angry faces only (n = 52).

50

Figure 9. Example of one trial in Study 2. A blank screen was presented for 500ms,
followed by a face for 500ms, then a response screen until participant response.

Additional Judgments. After the randomized, happy, and angry blocks,
participants were asked how difficult they found the experiment on a scale from 1 (very
easy) to 5 (very difficult) (M = 2.00, SD = 0.78, n = 11), to indicate which face type made
it easier to detect genuineness (aligned: 100%, misaligned: 0%, n = 11), and to indicate
any guesses for the study (open response). Participants were then thanked for their
participation and debriefed.
Results
No Context Block. A 2 (Veracity: genuine, posed)  2 (Alignment: aligned,
misaligned) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ ratings of
genuineness.7 Results revealed a main effect of veracity, F(1, 74) = 21.09, p < .001, p2 =

7

See Appendix C for analyses of observers’ reaction times to making genuineness ratings.
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.22. Specifically, genuine expressions (M = 0.49, SE = 0.06) were rated as more genuine
than posed expressions (M = 0.04, SD = 0.06). Results also revealed a main effect of
alignment, F(1, 74) = 5.43, p = .023, p2 = .07. Specifically, aligned faces (M = 0.40, SE
= 0.06) were rated as more genuine than misaligned faces (M = 0.14, SE = 0.06). There
was not, however, a veracity  alignment interaction, F(1, 74) = 0.18, p = .677, p2 =
.002 (see Figure 10). Although the interaction was not significant, Bonferroni-corrected
post-hoc tests were performed to assess the hypothesis that for posed expressions,
misaligned (vs. aligned) faces would be rated as less genuine. Results revealed that for
posed expressions, misaligned faces (M = -0.10, SE = 0.09) were rated as less genuine
than aligned faces (M = 0.19, SE = 0.09), t(74) = -2.29, p = .025. In contrast, for genuine
expressions, aligned faces (M = 0.61, SE = 0.09) were not rated differently from
misaligned faces (M = 0.37, SE = 0.09), t(74) = -1.82, p = .073.

Figure 10. The effect of veracity and alignment on observers’ mean ratings of
genuineness in the no context block of Study 2. Error bars represent  1 standard error.
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Happy Block. In the happy block, participants were told to rate how genuine or
fake each expression appeared for happy faces only. A 2 (Veracity: genuine, posed)  2
(Alignment: aligned, misaligned) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’
ratings of genuineness, revealing as main effect of veracity, F(1, 74) = 13.13, p < .001,
p2 = .15. Specifically, genuine expressions of happiness (M = 1.45, SE = 0.08) were
rated as more genuine than posed expressions of happiness (M = 1.10, SE = 0.08). There
was no main effect of alignment, F(1, 74) = 1.85, p =.178, p2 = .02, nor a veracity 
alignment interaction, F(1, 74) = 1.35, p = .249, p2 = .02 (see Figure 11).
Anger Block. In the happy block, participants were told to rate how genuine or
fake each expression of anger looks for angry faces only. A 2 (Veracity: genuine, posed)
 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on
observers’ ratings of genuineness, revealing a main effect of veracity, F(1, 74) = 34.59, p
< .001, p2 = .32. Specifically, genuine angry faces (M = -0.26, SE = 0.08) were rated as
more genuine than posed angry faces (M = -1.26, SE = 0.08). Results did not reveal a
main effect of alignment, F(1, 74) = 0.01, p = .925, nor a veracity  alignment
interaction, F(1, 74) = 0.39, p = .533 (see Figure 11).
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Figure 11. The effect of veracity and alignment on observers’ mean ratings of
genuineness in Study 2 for the randomized block (left panel), happy block (middle
panel), and angry block (right panel). Error bars represent  1 standard error.
Discussion
The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate whether interrupting holistic processing
would affect observers’ ratings of facial expression genuineness with a set of genuine and
deceptive (posed) expressions. Consistent with the Pilot Study and Study 1, posed
expressions were rated as less genuine when misaligned (vs. aligned), as would be
predicted by the holistic processing hypothesis. However, Study 2 also found that
genuine expressions that were misaligned (vs. aligned) were rated as less genuine,
conceptually replicating the results from Study 1. Overall, the pattern of results from
Study 2 closely mimics the pattern of results from Study 1: misalignment generally
decreased observers’ ratings of genuineness.
Additionally, Study 2 added two additional blocks to the primary experiment
block to explore whether instructions and emotion type would impact observers’
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genuineness ratings. Each of the basic emotions may be visually processed differently, as
each differs in which features are most salient or distinctive (Calvo et al., 2014; Calvo &
Nummenmaa, 2008). The saliency of a feature (e.g., a smile) can bias the interpretation
of other parts of the face when the face is aligned (Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al., 2013).
Moreover, since happiness and anger are associated with higher and lower levels of trust,
respectively (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Zebrowitz et al., 2013), these emotional
expressions may consequently have different effects on observers’ perceived genuineness
(Centorrino et al., 2015).
In the happy block, observers rated genuine expressions as more genuine than
posed expressions, but there was no effect of face alignment nor an interaction between
veracity and face alignment. This appears to indicate that all happy expressions were
rated as at least somewhat genuine, regardless of veracity or face alignment. Likewise, in
the angry block, observers rated genuine expressions as more genuine than posed
expressions but there was no effect of face alignment nor an interaction between veracity
and face alignment. Granted, statistical power was lower in these blocks (with fewer
trials) than the no context block, and visual inspection of the means suggests that there
may well be differences across these emotion conditions if a higher-powered study was
conducted. Another striking difference is the mean genuineness rating of all happy and all
angry faces; all happy faces (even the posed expressions) were well above 0, while
ratings of all angry faces were below the 0 mid-point. This appears to indicate that angry
faces overall were rated as somewhat disingenuous, regardless of veracity or face
alignment. Taken together, this pattern of results for the happy and angry block seems to
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suggest a valence effect for these facial expressions: happy expressions are rated as more
genuine than angry expressions, regardless of veracity or face alignment.
This is consistent with previous research, finding that more positively valenced
(e.g., happy) faces are rated as more trustworthy, whereas negatively valenced (e.g.,
angry) faces are rated as less trustworthy (Todorov et al., 2008). Interestingly, for both
the happy and angry blocks, no effect of alignment was observed. In other words,
interrupting holistic processing by misaligning faces, whether genuine or posed, did not
affect genuineness ratings, in contrast to the holistic processing hypothesis. Additionally,
the disfluency hypothesis was not supported, as misaligned (vs. aligned) posed
expressions were rated as less genuine.
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Chapter Five: General Discussion
A growing body of evidence suggests that genuine facial expressions differ from
deceptive facial expressions (Dopson et al., 1984; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Hess &
Kleck, 1990; ten Brinke et al., 2012). However, previous work on observers’ deception
detection accuracy of emotional facial expressions is mixed, with some studies indicating
above chance performance (e.g., McLellan et al., 2010) and others indicating chance
performance (e.g., Evanoff et al., 2016). In a series of studies, the present work aimed to
test competing hypotheses to explain why accuracy in detecting deceptive emotional
facial expressions may be poor.
On the one hand, since people process faces holistically (Piepers & Robbins,
2012) and rapidly attend to specific regions of the face when an emotion is expressed
(Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et al., 2018), one region of the face may interfere with or bias
observers’ perception of other regions (e.g., Calvo et al., 2013; Elsherif et al., 2017).
Indeed, previous work has demonstrated that deceptive facial expressions of emotion
typically involve incongruence among the upper and lower halves of the face (ten Brinke
& Porter, 2012b). Consequently, observers may be fooled by the simulated facial actions
of a deceptive actor (e.g., Zloteanu et al., 2019). However, previous work has
demonstrated that interrupting holistic processing by misaligning the face results in
higher accuracy in detecting an emotion expressed in one region of the face with less
interference from the other regions of the face, particularly when the irrelevant region of
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the face is incongruent with the target region (Calder et al., 2000; Tanaka et al., 2012).
Since there is evidence that deceptive facial expressions involve leakage that occurs
either in the upper or lower half of the face (Porter et al., 2012; Porter & ten Brinke,
2008), interrupting holistic processing may increase observers’ ability to detect
incongruence among the face halves by reducing holistic interference and the biasing
effect that one half of the face has on the other. In other words, interrupting holistic
processing allows observers to evaluate the degree of incongruence among face halves, as
they can be evaluated independently.
On the other hand, a separate line of research on social impressions of mixed
facial expressions—artificially produced full-faced blends of different emotions—
suggests that these faces are rated as less attractive and less trustworthy compared to their
non-mixed counterparts, an effect that is mediated by observers’ subjective experience of
processing disfluency (Olszanowski et al., 2018; Winkielman et al., 2015). These
findings suggest that observers’ subjective disfluency from mixed faces—which are
conceptually similar to the incongruent appearance of deceptive facial expressions—
could serve as a potential cue to deception when evaluating emotional facial expression
veracity. The current set of studies tested these two alternative hypotheses to explain why
previous deception detection accuracy performance is mixed for emotional facial
expressions. If disrupting holistic processing enhances observers’ ability to detect
incongruence among face halves, it would be expected that incongruent or deceptive
faces would be rated as less genuine when misaligned than aligned. In contrast, if holistic
processing facilitates the subjective experience of disfluency, serving as a cue to
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deception, it would be expected that incongruent or deceptive expressions would be rated
as less genuine when aligned compared to misaligned.
Across all the present studies, observers rated incongruent (Pilot Study, Study 1)
and posed (Study 2) expressions as less genuine when misaligned compared to aligned.
Thus, the current set of studies does not appear to support the idea that subjective
disfluency arises from aligned incongruent (Pilot Study, Study 1) or posed expressions
(Study 2), leading to lower ratings of genuineness relative to misaligned incongruent or
posed expressions. Instead, results are consistent with the idea that by interrupting
holistic processing, observers could better evaluate the degree of incongruence among the
face halves to inform their genuineness ratings. Indeed, this pattern of results emerged for
both artificially created (Pilot Study, Study 1) and real genuine and posed (Study 2)
expressions. This interpretation, however, is complicated by the findings for congruent
(Study 1) and genuine (Study 2) expressions, wherein misaligned faces were rated as less
genuine than aligned faces. This finding was unexpected and contrasts with previous
research using similar composite-face paradigms: either there is no difference in accuracy
in emotion recognition for aligned compared to misaligned congruent faces (e.g., Tanaka
et al., 2012), or there is an effect of holistic facilitation—greater accuracy and shorter
response times—for aligned compared to misaligned congruent faces (e.g., Calder et al.,
2000; Wegrzyn et al., 2015; White, 2000).
While the consistent effect for both Study 1 and Study 2 of misalignment
decreasing genuineness ratings for both congruent/genuine and incongruent/posed
expressions was unexpected, there are a few possibilities for why this occurred. First, the
task itself is arguably qualitatively different from previous work that has used dependent
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measures of emotion recognition (Calder et al., 2000; Tanaka et al., 2012). To my
knowledge, no other studies have used a composite face paradigm with a dependent
measure of genuineness or another comparable construct (c.f., Todorov et al., 2010). It is
possible that when making judgments of genuineness, misaligned faces are perceived as
bizarre or unusual. Relatedly, research on processing fluency—the ease with which an
observer can interpret or comprehend a message—influences evaluations of information
as true, familiar, frequent, or attractive (e.g., Dechêne et al., 2010; Reber & Schwarz,
1999). For example, when participants are judging the truthfulness of messages in videos
where the audio and video channels are slightly offset (vs. not), there is a decrease in the
processing fluency of the message, resulting in participants doubting the truthfulness of
the message, even though all of the verbal and nonverbal information is unchanged (ten
Brinke & Weisbuch, 2020). Likewise, in the current set of studies, it is possible that
misaligned compared to aligned faces in the current studies not only disrupted holistic
processing but also processing fluency, incurring negative evaluations from observers.
Although processing fluency was not directly measured, participants in the current
studies were asked whether aligned or misaligned faces made it easier to detect
genuineness, and overwhelmingly indicated that maligned faces made it more difficult.
Limitations and Future Directions
In addressing these competing hypotheses, the current studies had several
limitations. Since misalignment impacted both congruent/genuine and incongruent/posed
expressions, it remains unclear whether disrupting holistic processing enhances
observers’ ability to detect incongruence. While interrupting holistic processing,
misaligning faces may also induce subjective disfluency in observers if the task is to
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identify genuineness. Accordingly, it is difficult to disentangle whether effects of
misalignment on veracity judgments are due to disrupting holistic processing or are
artifacts of subjective disfluency. Alternatively, future research may instead employ a
manipulation of processing that does not distort faces in a manner that elicits subjective
disfluency. For example, previous research has explored whether priming participants
with a local (i.e., part-based) or global (i.e., holistic) processing orientation increases
recognition of emotional facial expressions (Martin et al., 2012). Specifically, prior to
displaying each facial expression, they used a Navon letter task, where figures are
composed of letters that are either consistent (e.g., an S composed of smaller Ss) or
inconsistent (e.g., a S composed of Ts). They were instructed to direct their attention to
either the global or local form of the letters and subsequently presented with a brief
display of an emotional facial expression. They found that when primed with a local (vs.
global) processing orientation, participants were modestly more accurate (2%) and faster
at emotion recognition. Future research may investigate whether such a manipulation of
processing orientation would be effective in discerning genuine from deceptive facial
expressions of emotion, changing the processing orientation of the stimuli observers
perceive rather than the stimuli themselves. Moreover, if observers were indeed more
accurate in discerning genuine from deceptive expressions when using a local (vs. global)
processing orientation, this would have more practical utility and ecological validity than
the misalignment of faces.
Additionally, it is possible that explicit instruction to compare the upper and
lower face when making genuineness judgments could have enhanced the effect of
interrupting holistic processing for incongruent and deceptive expressions. For example,
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Boutet, Lemieux, Goulet, & Collin (2017) examined whether task instructions would
alter fixations when discriminating whether two rapidly shown faces were the same or
different (upright or inverted). Faces had either configural changes (i.e., the relational
distances among face parts) or featural changes (e.g., different eyes). When participants
were unaware of what information would be relevant for the task, face processing was
dominated by fixation to the eyes. In contrast, when participants were informed that
relational information among the face parts was relevant for the task, participants directed
the majority of their fixations to the center of the face. Consequently, performance was
enhanced when participants were aware of what information would be relevant to the
task. In other words, participants’ visual attention strategies appeared to be driven by task
demands. Similarly, in Study 2, a happy and anger block was included to investigate how
emotion type and instructions could impact genuineness ratings. In the happy block,
observers rated genuine happy expressions are more genuine than posed expressions, but
there was no effect for alignment. Likewise, in the anger block, genuine anger
expressions were rated as more genuine than posed expressions, with no effect of
alignment. This pattern of results suggests that instructions or context impacts observers’
judgments of genuineness, but it is unclear what strategies they used or if their visual
attention differed compared to the initial no context block.
Another limitation is that across all studies, observers were asked to rate how
genuine the expression appeared to them. In the Pilot Study, it is unclear whether
observers were rating targets’ level of happiness (or lack of anger), or the genuineness of
those expressions. Indeed, even in Study 1 and Study 2, it is possible that features related
to the expressions displayed—happiness and anger—influenced observers’ genuineness
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ratings. For example, Olszanowski et al. (2018) found that trust judgments of mixed (i.e.,
disfluent) expressions were influenced by facial features related to valence but not social
motivation (i.e., approach, avoid). Specifically, pure happy (vs. sad) expressions were
judged as more trustworthy, whereas pure sad (vs. angry) expressions were judged as
more trustworthy. Interestingly, mixed happy–sad expressions (vs. pure expressions)
were judged as relatively less trustworthy, whereas mixed angry–sadness expressions (vs.
pure expressions) were not. Taken together, this suggests that judgments of trust for
disfluent expressions are more likely to be influenced by valence-related (vs. motivationrelated) information. Similarly, Del Líbano et al. (2018) found that the strongest predictor
of discrimination performance between happy and non-happy incongruent expressions
was affective valence—observers’ ratings of how emotionally positive or negative the
expressions appeared to be.
Consequently, it is critical for future research to consider other operationalizations
of the dependent variable that reduce the potential conflation between positively valenced
features of the face and genuineness ratings. Indeed, this is a difficult task as positive trait
judgments in person perception are strongly correlated with trust judgments (Oosterhof &
Todorov, 2008). However, Namba et al. (2018) presented participants with genuine and
posed emotional expressions and asked participants to indicate whether a target was
showing a given emotion and whether a target was feeling a given emotion. Results
revealed that genuine (vs. posed) expressions were rated more as felt for all presented
expressions. This procedure allows participants to separately rate the degree to which the
ostensible emotion is displayed and the degree to which the emotion is internally
experienced by the target, potentially reducing the influence of positively valenced
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features. Relatedly, while the present series of studies focused on the positively valenced
expression of happiness and the negatively valenced expression of anger, which have
diagnostic regions in the lower and upper face, respectively (Calvo, Fernández-Martín, et
al., 2018; Schurgin et al., 2014), future research should consider other emotional
expressions that vary on valence, visual saliency, and distinctiveness of features (e.g.,
Calvo et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2005; Wegrzyn et al., 2015).
Future research should also investigate whether observers’ visual attention differs
when viewing genuine compared to deceptive expressions. To my knowledge, only one
study has examined visual attention during a deception detection task. Bond (2008)
explored whether we could identify lie detection ‘experts’ and if so, to study their
detection behavior using eye-tracking. He found two individuals—correctional officers—
who scored 80–90% accurate on veracity judgments across two video sets. These two
experts’ ocular movement data revealed that at the time of the veracity judgment, one
expert focused more on the face, whereas the other looked more at the arm and torso
areas. Unfortunately, further analyses of what nonverbal (i.e., facial, torso, and arm)
behaviors were evident during these experts’ judgments were not provided. In other
words, while we know where these experts were looking at the time of judgment, we do
not know what occurred on the face or body of targets that contributed to veracity
judgments.
More broadly, Cavlo, Fernández-Martín, Gutiérrez-García, and Lundqvist (2018)
investigated ocular behavior on diagnostic regions for dynamic emotional facial
expressions, finding that each of the basic emotions follow specific visual scanpath
profiles. Specifically, the eye region was looked at earlier and longer for angry and sad
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faces, the mouth region earlier and longer for happy faces, the nose and cheek region for
disgust, and a balance of viewing time of the eye and mouth regions for surprise and fear.
Other work has demonstrated that gaze allocation is biased toward diagnostic face
regions (e.g., Schurgin et al., 2014), and that increased visual attention to diagnostic
facial features is correlated with improved recognition performance (Wong et al., 2005).
It is currently unknown whether visual attention as measured by ocular behavior
would be different for deceptive compared to genuine expressions. Given the perceptual
saliency of the mouth (e.g., Calvo et al., 2013), it is possible that during deceptive
displays where a felt emotion (e.g., anger) is masked with a smile, observers’ visual
attention is brought to the mouth region and fails to attend to the eye region, where
leakage is more likely to occur (Porter et al., 2012). Consequently, observers would
visually ‘miss’ the critical information in the upper region of the face that reveals the
underlying emotion (see also Iwasaki & Noguchi, 2016).
Additionally, there is reason to believe that observers may have different scanpath
patterns depending on the type of judgments they are making. For example, Calvo,
Krumhuber, and Fernandez-Martín (2018) examined the visual attention mechanism in
processing facial expression when participants are making judgments of happiness and
trustworthiness. While recording their eye movement, participants saw dynamic faces
that began as neutral and morphed into congruent happy (happiness in the upper and
lower face) or incongruent happy (neutral eyes and smiling mouth), subsequently judging
how happy or how trustworthy the faces appear. Results revealed that the eye region was
the cue observers used in making trustworthiness judgments, whereas the mouth was the
cue used for making happiness judgments (see also Calvo, Gutiérrez-García, et al., 2013).
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In other words, scanpaths in judgments of genuineness may differ from judgments of
emotion displayed (i.e., emotion recognition), and there may be other differences
between scanpaths for genuine compared to deceptive expressions. This work may reveal
additional visual mechanisms, such as attentional processes, not explored in the current
work that may better explain why detecting deceptive facial expressions of emotion is
generally poor.
Conclusion
I argue that visual perception plays an important role in the process of deception
detection and that greater consideration of how people visually process faces may help to
explain why subtle cues to deception are not used by observers to make more accurate
veracity judgments. The current series of studies investigated two competing
hypotheses—the holistic processing hypotheses and the subjective disfluency
hypothesis—that could explain why deceptive detection accuracy of emotional facial
expressions is mixed. Across all studies, the subjective disfluency hypothesis was not
supported. While support was garnered for the holistic processing hypothesis, cautious
interpretations are warranted, as interrupting holistic processing decreased ratings of
genuineness for both genuine and deceptive facial expressions of emotion. Future
research should continue to consider how people visually process faces and its impact on
their veracity judgments.
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Appendix A
The Effect of Emotional Intensity on Genuineness Ratings
In the Pilot Study, there was a significant alignment × congruence interaction,
wherein for congruent expressions, misaligned (vs. aligned) faces were rated as more
genuine, whereas for incongruent expressions, misaligned (vs. aligned) faces were rated
as less genuine. Since congruent and incongruent expressions varied by intensity (20%,
40%, 60%) in the upper and lower face as well as alignment, I further explored whether
emotional intensity and alignment interact. Namely, I examined whether there was an
alignment × emotional intensity interaction when the upper and lower face had the same
emotional intensity (e.g., 20% upper face intensity, 20% lower face intensity) for
congruent and incongruent expressions.
Congruent Expressions: Matched Intensity
A 2 (alignment: aligned, misaligned) × 3 (emotional intensity: 20%, 40%, 60%)
within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ genuineness ratings of congruent
expressions. Results revealed a main effect of alignment, F(1, 66) = 11.10, p < .001, p2 =
.14. Misaligned faces (M = 1.27, SE = 0.18) were rated as more genuine than aligned
faces (M = 0.82, SE = 0.19). Results also revealed a main effect of emotional intensity,
F(1.36, 90.07) = 174.27, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that each
emotional intensity differed significantly from one another (all pairwise ts > 10.64, all ps
< .001), where congruent faces displaying 60% intensity (M = 3.03, SE = 0.23) were
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rated as more genuine than faces displaying 40% intensity (M = 1.07, SE = 0.19), which
were rated as more genuine than faces displaying 20% intensity (M = -0.97, SE = 0.22).
There was not, however, an alignment × emotional intensity interaction, F(1.98, 130.73)
= 0.16, p = .852 (see Figure 12).
Incongruent Expressions: Matched Intensity
A 2 (alignment: aligned, misaligned) × 3 (emotional intensity: 20%, 40%, 60%)
within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ genuineness ratings of
incongruent expressions. Results did not reveal a main effect of alignment, F(1, 66) =
0.31, p = .582. There was a main effect of emotional intensity, F(1.64, 108.56) = 50.21, p
< .001, p2 = .43. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that all pairwise
comparisons were significantly different (all ts > 3.71, all ps < .001), where incongruent
faces displaying 60% intensity (M = -3.54, SE = 0.25) were rated as less genuine than
faces displaying 40% intensity (M = -2.16, SE = 0.20), which were rated as less genuine
than faces displaying 20% intensity (M = -1.50, SE = 0.21). This main effect, however,
was qualified by an alignment × emotional intensity interaction, F(2, 131.99) = 3.32, p =
0.39. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that all pairwise comparison differed
significantly except for aligned incongruent faces displaying 20% intensity (M = -1.54,
SE = 0.24) compared to aligned incongruent faces displaying 40% intensity (M = -2.27,
SE = 0.20), t(66) = 2.36, p = .064 (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12. The effect of emotional intensity and alignment on observers’ genuineness
ratings for congruent expressions (left panel) and incongruent expressions (right
panel). Emotional intensity across comparisons is matched among the upper and
lower face (e.g., 20% upper face, 20% lower face). Error bars represent ± 1
standard error.

The Effect of Congruence and Alignment on Reaction Time
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Emotional Congruence: congruent,
incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ reaction times. First,
reaction times that were ± three standard deviations were excluded (1.98% of trials).
Results revealed a main effect of alignment, F(1, 66) = 7.60, p = .008, p2 = .10.
Specifically, observers spent longer on aligned (M = 5.47 sec, SE = 0.25) compared to
misaligned (M = 5.14 sec, SE = 0.20) faces. There was no main effect of congruence,
F(1, 66) = 0.16, p = .693, nor an alignment  congruence interaction, F(1, 66) = 0.21, p =
.647 (see Figure 13).
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Figure 13. The effect of congruence (columns) and alignment (rows) on observers’
reaction times (in seconds) when making genuineness ratings in the Pilot Study. Note:
Reaction times  3 standard deviations have been excluded.
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Appendix B
In Study 1, results revealed that there was not an alignment  congruency
interaction. It was explored whether this interaction could be qualified by emotional
intensity (20% or 60%). Specifically, I explored whether subtle expressions (20% in the
upper and lower face) evidenced a different pattern of results compared to strong
expressions (60% in the upper and lower face). In other words, it is possible that
interrupting holistic processing enhances the detection of emotional incongruence for
subtle (vs. strong) expressions.
Subtle Expressions
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Emotional Congruence: congruent,
incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ genuineness ratings
for subtle expressions (i.e., 20% intensity in the upper and lower face). Results revealed a
main effect of alignment, F(1, 78) = 19.19, p < .001. Specifically, aligned faces (M =
2.01, SE = 0.22) were rated as more genuine than misaligned faces (M = 0.83, SE = 0.26).
There was not a main effect of congruence, F(1, 78) = 1.37, p = .246, nor an alignment ×
congruence interaction, F(1, 78) = 0.27, p = .606 (see Figure 14).
Strong Expressions
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned) × 2 (Emotional Congruence: congruent,
incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ genuineness ratings
for subtle expressions (i.e., 60% intensity in the upper and lower face). Results did not
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reveala main effect of alignment, F(1, 78) = 1.08, p = .302. There was, however, a main
effect of congruence, F(1, 78) = 42.13, p < .001. Specifically, incongruent expressions
(M = -1.62, SE = 0.16) were rated as less genuine than congruent expressions (M = -0.07,
SE = 0.21). Results did not reveal an alignment × congruence interaction, F(1, 78) = 0.03,
p = .869 (see Figure 14).

Figure 14. The effect of alignment and congruence on observers’ genuineness ratings for
subtle expressions (left panel) and strong expressions (right panel). Subtle expressions
were 20% intensity in the upper and lower face. Strong expressions were 60% intensity in
the upper and lower face. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error.

The Effect of Congruence and Alignment on Reaction Time
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Emotional Congruence: congruent,
incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ reaction times. First,
reaction times that were  three standard deviations were excluded (0.11% of trials).
Results revealed no main effect of alignment, F(1, 78) = 0.40, p = .530, no main effect of

94

congruence, F(1, 78) = 0.81, p = .372, nor an alignment  congruence interaction, F(1,
78) = 0.47, p = .496 (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. The effect of congruence (columns) and alignment (rows) on observers’
reaction times (in seconds) when making genuineness ratings in Study 1. Note: Reaction
times ± 3 standard deviations have been excluded.
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Appendix C
The Effect of Veracity and Alignment on Reaction Time
A 2 (Alignment: aligned, misaligned)  2 (Veracity: genuine, posed) withinsubjects ANOVA was performed on observers’ reaction times. First, reaction times that
were ± three standard deviations were excluded (0.27% of trials). Results revealed no
main effect of alignment, F(1, 74) = 0.14, p = .711, no main effect of veracity, F(1, 74) =
0.00, p = .949, nor an alignment  congruence interaction, F(1, 78) = 0.42, p = .520 (see
Figure 16).

Figure 16. The effect of veracity(columns) and alignment (rows) on observers’ reaction
times (in seconds) when making genuineness ratings in Study 2. Note: Reaction times ± 3
standard deviations have been excluded.
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